super.money FY26 Results: Revenue Triples to ₹292 Cr

7 min read · Last updated: October 24, 2026

In its FY26 results, super.money, the UPI payments app Flipkart launched in 2024, grew operating revenue 3.3x to ₹292.4 Cr from ₹88.8 Cr. Its net loss still widened 78.5% to ₹263.8 Cr, because expenses rose 130% to ₹557.1 Cr. About 84.7% of revenue came from loan facilitation, not payments.

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The report

• Inc42: Flipkart-Backed super.money's FY26 Revenue Triples To ₹292 Cr, October 24, 2026

In September 2026, super.money processed more than 40.51 crore UPI transactions. That is over 405 million payments in a single month (1 crore is 10 million), worth more than ₹19,613.3 Cr. It is the fifth largest UPI player in India.

Do the division and the average payment comes out to roughly ₹484. Small, everyday stuff. Tea, groceries, a cab.

Here is the twist. All of that volume is not where the money comes from. The money comes from loans.

Key takeaways

• Operating revenue grew from ₹88.8 Cr to ₹292.4 Cr in FY26, about 3.3x.
• Net loss grew 78.5% to ₹263.8 Cr, up from ₹147.8 Cr in FY25.
• Total expenses rose 130% to ₹557.1 Cr. It spent about ₹1.91 for every ₹1 of operating revenue.
• Loan facilitation drove around 84.7% of revenue, roughly ₹247.7 Cr.
• Business promotion alone cost ₹341 Cr, more than the company's entire operating revenue.
• In September 2026 it processed 40.51 crore UPI transactions worth over ₹19,613.3 Cr.

What did super.money report for FY26?

super.money reported FY26 operating revenue of ₹292.4 Cr, other income of ₹90 lakh, and total income of ₹293.3 Cr. Against ₹557.1 Cr of expenses, that produced a net loss of ₹263.8 Cr. It reported no tax expense or exceptional items, and its total comprehensive loss was ₹262.9 Cr.

FY26 here means India's financial year 2026, which runs from April 2025 to March 2026.

The headline sounds great. Revenue tripled. But the loss line grew by ₹116 Cr in the same year, and that is the part worth reading slowly.

Revenue went up by ₹203.6 Cr. Expenses went up by ₹315.3 Cr. Costs grew faster than revenue in absolute rupees, so the hole got deeper even as the top line got bigger.

What is super.money and who runs it?

super.money is a fintech app launched by Flipkart, the Walmart-owned Indian e-commerce company, in 2024. Its core product is UPI payments, where it ranks fifth in India. It also facilitates loans through banks and NBFCs, books fixed deposits, and offers co-branded credit cards with partner banks.

UPI is India's instant bank-to-bank payment system. If you want the plumbing explained, I wrote a breakdown of how UPI actually works and the myths around it.

The founder and CEO is Prakash Sikaria. Before super.money he was a senior vice president at Flipkart, running its ads business, Shopsy, Cleartrip and Yantra. So this is not a first-time founder figuring out unit economics in a garage. It is a big-company operator with a big-company parent.

How did super.money's numbers change from FY25 to FY26?

Every number in this table comes from the Inc42 report linked at the top. The multiples in the last column are my arithmetic on those numbers.

Item	FY25	FY26	Change
Launched by Flipkart	2024
Operating revenue	₹88.8 Cr	₹292.4 Cr	about 3.3x
Total expenses	₹241.8 Cr	₹557.1 Cr	+130%
Net loss	₹147.8 Cr	₹263.8 Cr	+78.5%
Business promotion		₹341 Cr	3.34x
Employee benefits	₹79.5 Cr	₹138.1 Cr	+73.8%
Marketplace charges	₹43.5 Cr	₹15.6 Cr	-64.2%
Finance costs	₹0.1 Cr	₹11.1 Cr	about 111x
Other expenses	₹17.3 Cr	₹47.9 Cr	+177.2%
UPI volume, September 2026		40.51 Cr transactions, ₹19,613.3 Cr

The report does not give the FY25 promotion figure directly. A 3.34x rise to ₹341 Cr implies it was somewhere around ₹102 Cr.

One honest gap: the five expense lines add up to ₹553.7 Cr. The report does not break out the remaining ₹3.4 Cr.

Why are loans 84.7% of super.money's revenue?

Loans are 84.7% of super.money's revenue because loan facilitation is the product that earns real money per user. super.money connects borrowers with banks and NBFCs and earns from that marketplace. In FY26 that worked out to roughly ₹247.7 Cr, leaving only about ₹44.7 Cr from everything else combined.

That "everything else" includes UPI, fixed deposits and co-branded credit cards. The report does not split those out, so I will not guess at them.

But look at the shape. Hundreds of millions of payments a month on one side. Most of the revenue from a lending marketplace on the other.

The payments app is the shop window. The loan marketplace is the till.

That is the real story of these results. UPI brings people in daily. Credit is what they pay for, indirectly, through the lenders.

Where did super.money spend ₹557 Cr?

super.money spent ₹341 Cr of its ₹557.1 Cr FY26 expenses on business promotion, about 61% of total costs. Employee benefits were next at ₹138.1 Cr, then other expenses at ₹47.9 Cr, marketplace charges at ₹15.6 Cr and finance costs at ₹11.1 Cr.

Here is each line, with what I think it tells you.

1. Business promotion, ₹341 Cr. The biggest line by far, up 3.34x. This is the cost of getting people to install and use the app. On its own it is ₹48.6 Cr more than the company's operating revenue.
2. Employee benefits, ₹138.1 Cr. Up 73.8% from ₹79.5 Cr. Slower growth than revenue, which is the one cost line moving in a healthy direction relative to the top line.
3. Other expenses, ₹47.9 Cr. Up 177.2% from ₹17.3 Cr. Inc42 says this includes outside contracted services and communication charges.
4. Marketplace charges, ₹15.6 Cr. The only line that fell, down 64.2% from ₹43.5 Cr.
5. Finance costs, ₹11.1 Cr. Up from just ₹0.1 Cr. A jump like that usually means the company has started carrying some form of borrowing or financing cost. The report does not say what it is, so treat that as a question, not an answer.

If you strip promotion out, the remaining costs come to about ₹216 Cr against ₹292.4 Cr of revenue. That is the clearest single sentence in these results: without the promotion spend, the operating business would roughly cover its other costs.

That does not mean promotion is waste. It is what built the 40.51 crore monthly transactions. It means the loss is mostly a choice about growth speed, not a broken product.

Is super.money's loss a bad sign?

super.money's FY26 loss is large but not surprising for its stage. It lost about ₹0.90 for every ₹1 of operating revenue in FY26, compared with about ₹1.66 per ₹1 in FY25. Loss per rupee of revenue improved, even though the absolute loss grew 78.5%.

Both things are true at once, and most headlines only print one of them.

The absolute number got worse. ₹263.8 Cr is a lot of money to lose in one year. But the ratio got better, because revenue grew faster in percentage terms than the loss did. Revenue grew about 229%. The loss grew 78.5%.

Whether that is good depends on one thing the report cannot tell us: whether promotion spend can come down without the loan marketplace shrinking with it. If yes, the path to profit is visible. If users only stay while they are being paid to, it is not.

For a similar pattern in Indian consumer tech, see how Swiggy's Instamart losses played out in its Q2 FY27 results.

What can you copy from super.money's model?

I build products for developers, not a payments company. I still think there are four lessons here that work at any size.

• Separate your traffic product from your revenue product. super.money's daily habit is payments. Its revenue is lending. Your free tool, open source library or free tier can be the habit, while a different, smaller feature earns the money. Know which is which.
• Measure cost per rupee of revenue, not just the loss. The absolute loss rose 78.5%. The loss per ₹1 of revenue fell from about ₹1.66 to ₹0.90. Track the ratio every month, or a growing loss will scare you off a business that is actually improving.
• Know what your biggest cost line buys you. Promotion was 61% of super.money's spend. If one line is most of your costs, you need a number for what each rupee of it brings back.
• Partner instead of building the hard part. super.money does not lend its own money in this report. It connects borrowers with banks and NBFCs. Marketplaces let you earn on a regulated product without becoming the regulated entity.

The uncomfortable lesson is scale. A ₹484 average payment, 405 million times a month, still was not the main source of revenue. Volume is not a business model on its own. Something on top of the volume has to charge.

FAQ

How much revenue did super.money make in FY26?

super.money's operating revenue in FY26 was ₹292.4 Cr, more than triple the ₹88.8 Cr it reported in FY25. With ₹90 lakh of other income, total income was ₹293.3 Cr. Around 84.7% of revenue came from its loan marketplace.

How much did super.money lose in FY26?

super.money reported a net loss of ₹263.8 Cr in FY26, 78.5% higher than its ₹147.8 Cr loss in FY25. Its total comprehensive loss was ₹262.9 Cr. It reported no tax expense or exceptional items.

Who owns super.money?

super.money was launched in 2024 by Flipkart, which is owned by Walmart. Its founder and CEO is Prakash Sikaria, a former Flipkart senior vice president who ran its ads business, Shopsy, Cleartrip and Yantra.

How big is super.money in UPI?

super.money is the fifth largest UPI player in India. In September 2026 it processed more than 40.51 crore UPI transactions, worth more than ₹19,613.3 Cr, which works out to an average of roughly ₹484 per transaction.

Pick your own "traffic product" and your "revenue product" this week and write down which is which, then browse the free tools on Art of Code or the latest developer jobs on Art of Code if you want to work on fintech problems like this one.

Written by Adithya Guttha, Founder of Art of Code.